Pepperdine University School of Law 
Legal Summaries by Rollin, Matthew
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law 
Judiciary 
Volume 39 Issue 2 Article 3 
2019 
Pepperdine University School of Law Legal Summaries 
Matthew Rollin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Matthew Rollin, Pepperdine University School of Law Legal Summaries, 39 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. 
Judiciary 54 (2019) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol39/iss2/3 
This Legal Summary is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law 
Judiciary by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact 
josias.bartram@pepperdine.edu , anna.speth@pepperdine.edu. 
   
 
 
 
 
    
54 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 39-2 
Pepperdine University School of Law  
Legal Summaries  
 
 
TABLE OF CASES 
 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
 
Iancu v. Brunetti,  
139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019)…………………….…….............................55 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 
Kidd v. Thomson Reuters Corporation,  
925 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2019)…………..…………………………….58 
 
Kilgour v. Securities and Exchange Commission,  
942 F.3d 113 (2d. Cir. 2019).………………………………………61 
 
OSI Pharmaceuticals, LLC v. Apotex Inc.,  
939 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019)…………………………………....65 
 
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Elm 3DS Innovations, LLC,  
925 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019)…………………………………....68 
 
Secretary of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor v. Seward Ship’s 
Drydock, Inc.,  
937 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2019)…………………….………………71 
 
Zuniga v. Barr,  
934 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2019)……………..……………………....75 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 
Haynes v. Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc.,  
391 F.Supp.3d 1128 (S.D. Fla. 2018)..………..……………………79 
 
    
Spring 2020       Legal Summaries 55 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
 
IANCU V. BRUNETTI 
139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
 After being denied a federal trademark registration for the 
trademark “FUCT”, Erik Brunetti brought suit challenging the 
Lanham Act.  15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) states that a trademark is barred 
from registration if it “consists of or compromises immoral … or 
scandalous matter.” Brunetti argued that the bar on “immoral” and 
“scandalous matter” violates the First Amendment.  The Court held 
that the bar violates the First Amendment because it discriminates on 
the basis of viewpoint.   
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
Under the Lanham Act, a federal trademark registration is not 
required for a trademark to be valid.1  The owner of an unregistered 
trademark may use the mark in commerce an even enforce it against 
infringers.2  However, there are benefits of registering a trademark, 
such as evidence of validity and constructive notice to the rest of the 
world of who owns the trademark.3  Erik Brunetti, an entrepreneur, is 
the founder of a clothing line called FUCT.4  The brand name and 
trademark is not meant to be a word, but it is supposed to be spelt 
out, as in F-U-C-T.5  Although it is not meant to be read, one is likely 
to naturally read it, which causes the mark to be misinterpreted as 
vulgar, immoral or scandalous.     
After submitting the trademark registration, the Patent and 
Trademark Office and the Patent and Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board determined that the section 1052(a) of the Lanham Act barred 
Mr. Brunetti from obtaining a trademark registration for “FUCT” 
                                                          
1 Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019). 
2 Id. at 2297. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
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because it was “total vulgar” and “therefore unregistrable.”6  Mr. 
Brunetti then filed an appeal with the Federal Circuit, in which the 
court held that the bar of a trademark registration because of 
“immoral or scandalous matter” is in violation of the First 
Amendment.7  The Supreme Court of the United States then granted 
certiorari.8 
Beginning its analysis, the Supreme Court looked at a 
previous holding, Matal v. Tam.9  There, the Court was looking at 
whether Lanham Act’s ban on disparaging trademarks was 
unconstitutional.10  The Court held that, “if a trademark registration 
bar is viewpoint-based, it is unconstitutional.”11  In order to 
determine whether “immoral or scandalous” are viewpoint-based or 
viewpoint-neutral, the Court looked to the ordinary meaning and 
dictionary definition of the words.12  After looking to multiple 
different sources of the meaning of the words immoral and 
scandalous, the Court came to the conclusion that the Lanham Act 
statute favors terms that are “aligned with conventional moral 
standards” and disfavors terms that are “hostile” to those standards.13 
To further illustrate its point, the Court looks to past examples of 
trademark registrations that had been denied on the grounds of 
immoral or scandalous matter, and came to the conclusion that, “the 
rejected marks express opinions that are, at the least, offensive to 
many Americans.”14  Because of that conclusion, the Court 
determined that these are viewpoint based and like in Tam, “a law 
disfavoring ideas that offend discriminates based on viewpoint” and 
is in “violation of the First Amendment.”15 
 
                                                          
6 Id. at 2298. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
10 Id. at 1765. 
11 Id. 
12 Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2299. 
13 Id. at 2299-2300. 
14 Id. at 2300. 
15 Id. 
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Holding: 
 
Having decided that “immoral and scandalous matter” are 
considered viewpoint based, the Court, sticking to precedent, held, 
that because it is viewpoint based, it therefore violates the First 
Amendment.16  The Court did go on however, mentioning that the 
“immoral and scandalous” bar “is substantially overbroad.”17  The 
Court goes on to say that there are many swearwords in the world, 
and even more immoral and scandalous ideas, and the fact that the 
Lanham Act excludes all of them is too much.18  Thus, barring 
trademark registration based on opinion or the viewpoint that the 
words may offend the American people is a violation of the First 
Amendment and therefore, that section of the Lanham Act is 
unconstitutional.19 
 
Impact: 
 
Due to the fact that Brunetti had just been decided in this past 
term, the impact on the future of trademark registration is not really 
known.  The Court seemed to be worried about how broad the 
language of the Lanham Act was, encompassing anything that might 
be considered “immoral or scandalous” to the average American.  
There are still bars to getting a registered trademark, but this ruling, 
without a doubt, narrowed the outer limits to the statutory bar.  
Ultimately, this is a win for trademark owners who have had 
trademark registrations denied in the past because of immoral or 
scandalous matter, but only time will tell if trademark owners will 
actually be able to get previous denied trademark registrations 
approved under this new ruling.    
 
 
 
                                                          
16 Id. at 2302. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 
KIDD V. THOMSON REUTERS CORPORATION 
925 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2019) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
After being denied for a job position, in which she was ranked 
as the “top candidate,” Lindsey Kidd filed suit against Thomson 
Reuters alleging that the background check provided by them 
containing false information was in violation of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (“FCRA”).  Kidd alleges that the false information 
cost her a job position when the CLEAR report sent to the Georgia 
Department of Health falsely stated she had been convicted of theft.  
The district court held, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed that Thomson Reuters is not a consumer reporting agency 
and therefore, not regulated by the Fair Credit Reporting Act.  
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act, also known as the FRCA, was 
established in order to regulate the circumstances in which a 
“consumer reporting agency may furnish consumer reports to third 
parties, and the information contained in those reports.”20  The 
typical consumer report is sold to third parties to determine lender 
eligibility, credit scores, employment decisions, insurance coverage 
and more.21  When a consumer reporting agency fails to comply with 
the act, such as providing false information, that company may be 
subject to civil liability resulting in actual and punitive damages.22  
This issue in this case is whether Thomson Reuters is considered a 
consumer reporting agency in accordance with the FRCA.23 
                                                          
20 Kidd v. Thomson Reuters Corporation, 925 F.3d 99, 101 (2d Cir. 2019). 
21 Id. at 101. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 103. 
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Thomson Reuters is the owner and operator of a research 
database known as Consolidated Lead Evaluation and Reporting, also 
known as CLEAR.24  This database is home to numerous types of 
information, such as, “motor vehicle records, court records, aliases, 
the status of professional licenses, real property transactions, and 
similar information.”25  The majority of CLEAR subscribers are 
government and law enforcement agencies.26  Thomson Reuters has 
very strictly guidelines on what the information obtained from their 
databases can be used for, and they explicitly state that the 
information may not be used for anything related to or seemingly 
related to the FRCA.27  They require their subscribers to commit, in 
writing, that they will not use the information for purposes of the 
FRCA, and if they are found in violation of these terms and 
conditions, they account may be terminated.28  Between 2012 and 
2016, forty-six different subscribers were found to be in violation of 
these terms, in which ten were terminated by Thomson.29 
In 2014, the Georgia Department of Health requested the data 
of Ms. Kidd to help aid them in the determination of hiring her for a 
job in which she was ranked as the top candidate.30  Upon receiving 
the background information, the report indicated that Ms. Kidd had 
been convicted of theft, and because of this newly discovered 
information, the Georgia Department of Health decided to pursue 
options elsewhere, leaving Ms. Kidd out of a job.31  Ms. Kidd filed 
suit alleging that Thomson Reuters was in violation of the FRCA.32 
In determining whether Thomson Reuters is considered a consumer 
reporting agency, the district court looked to the language of the 
FRCA.33  The court determined that “an entity is a consumer 
                                                          
24 Id. at 101. 
25 Id. at 102. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 103. 
31 Id. 
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
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reporting agency under the Act if it regularly assembles consumer 
information with a particular purpose or subjective intention – 
namely, of providing it to third parties for the use in connection with 
an FCRA-regulated end, such as employment eligibility.”34  The 
court went on to state that a consumer reporting agency is “an entity 
that intends the information it furnishes to constitute a consumer 
report.”35  The court essentially states that there is a specific intent 
requirement for one to be a consumer reporting agency, and the court 
looks to several other circuits that have also developed a similar 
specific intent or purpose standard.36  The district court held that 
based on the text of the FRCA and how other circuits have 
interpreted that text, that Thomson Reuters is not a consumer 
reporting agency and therefore, not regulated by the FCRA.37 
 
Holding: 
 
In determining whether or not the district court errored in its 
decisions by stating that Thomson Reuters was not a consumer 
reporting agency, the Second Circuit, like the district court, went 
back and looked at the text of the FRCA.38  Similarly, they 
determined that there was a specific intent requirement for the entity 
to actually be considered a consumer reporting agency.39  Looking at 
all the facts in the record, the court determined that there was no 
specific intent for Thomson Reuters to become a consumer reporting 
agency, in fact, there was plenty of evidence to suggest the 
opposite.40   
The court went through all of the evidence such as the 
extensive terms and conditions, the fact that on multiple occasions 
Thomson Reuters would require commitments from their CLEAR 
subscribers that they were not using the information for FRCA 
                                                          
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 105. 
36 Id.  
37 Id. at 107. 
38 Id.  
39 Id.  
40 Id.  
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purposes, and the fact that Thomson Reuters had terminated accounts 
that were found to be in violation of the terms and FRCA.41  All of 
this evidence strongly pointed that Thomson Reuters had no interest 
and therefore, no specific intent to be a consumer reporting agency.42  
Thus, the court held that Thomson Reuters is not a consumer 
reporting agency and is not regulated by the FRCA.43  The court 
affirmed the district court’s decision of summary judgment on behalf 
of Thomson Reuters.44 
 
Impact: 
 
The impact of this case seems reassuring, but at the same time 
troubling.  In this present case, it is reassuring, because Thomson 
Reuters took extra steps and went above and beyond to make sure 
that its CLEAR subscribers were not using the information obtained 
in ways that would violate the FCRA.  However, there is the potential 
for other companies to not be as careful as Thomas Reuters had been 
in this case, which opens the door for those companies not qualifying 
as consume reporting agencies, thus, not subject to the FCRA, but 
ultimately are violating the FCRA.  This seems to be one of those 
‘time will tell’ cases to see how wide of an impact it has.  It appears 
to be the type of case where one needs to sit back and watch it unfold 
before they are able to make an determination in how it will impact 
future cases. 
 
 
KILGOUR V. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
942 F.3d 113 (2d. Cir. 2019) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
After being denied by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) for whistleblower rewards, petitioners, John 
Doe, Colin Kilgour and Daniel Williams, appealed to the Second 
                                                          
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
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Circuit claiming that they were improperly denied their awards.  
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, which was passed by Congress in 2010, 
the SEC “shall pay an award or awards to 1 or more whistleblowers 
who voluntarily provided original information to the Commission 
that lead to the successful enforcement of a covered judicial or 
administrative action.”  Based on the statutory definitions of “original 
information” and “leading to successful enforcement”, the SEC 
denied petitioners claims stating that the information was not original 
as defined.  The Second Circuit upheld and affirmed the SEC’s 
decision, denying petitioners their share of the rewards.  
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC “shall pay an award or 
awards to 1 or more whistleblowers who voluntarily provided 
original information to the Commission that lead to the successful 
enforcement of a covered judicial or administrative action.”45  
Original information is defined as “information not already known to 
the Commission from any other source, unless the applicant is the 
original source of the information.”46  Leading to successful 
enforcement is defined as “information that (1) was sufficiently 
specific, credible, and timely to cause the SEC to open, reopen, or 
expand an examination or investigation leading to a successful 
judicial or administrative action … or (2) concerned conduct that was 
already under examination or investigation and its submission 
significantly contributed to the success of the action.”47 
Starting in June 2010, the SEC started to receive information 
from Deutsche Bank (“DB”) employees claiming that DB “was 
overstating the value of certain assets to improve the appearance of 
DB’s financial performance to its shareholders, the market and the 
investing public.”48  Shortly after this complaint was filed, John Doe 
met with the SEC, in which he described the same information to the 
                                                          
45 Kilgour v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 942 F.3d 113, 114 (2d. Cir. 
2019). 
46 Id. at 113. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. at 114. 
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Commission.49  Unlike the first Claimant, John Doe had difficulty 
expressing himself to the Commission and seemed to be rather 
disorganized.50  On multiple occasions, Doe had met with the 
Commission to provide more information, but every time the 
Commission determined that the information was duplicative of the 
information they had already received from the first Claimant.51 
In June 2013, a second Claimant submitted a report to the 
Commission, which was very “detailed and comprehensive [and] 
absolutely critical to the investigation.”52 This report was written by 
petitioners Kilgour and Williams.53  After this reported was 
submitted and finalized, Claimant 2 gave permission to both Kilgour 
and Williams to file for the whistleblower reward because they were 
the authors of the report.54  In July 2016, the SEC accepted 
whistleblower reward claims for claimant 1 and claimant 2, but 
denied the claims of Doe, Kilgour and Williams for a lack of original 
information.55  Petitioners appealed to the Second Circuit.56 
John Doe’s main argument was that the SEC acted in a 
capricious manner because they favored the information from 
Claimant 2 over his.57  The court held that it was reasonable for the 
SEC staff members to find that information Doe had provided was 
not credible because he was extremely disorganized, and his 
testimony was incoherent and jumbled.58  Meanwhile, Claimant 2’s 
information was “consistent and critical information that led to the 
successful enforcement action.”59  The court determined that the SEC 
personnel reasonably believed that the information by Claimant 2 
                                                          
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 115. 
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 120. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. at 121. 
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was more helpful because of the way it was provided to them.60  
Therefore, the manner in which the SEC acted was reasonable and 
not capricious.61 
Kilgour and Williams’ main argument was that they were 
entitled to whistleblower award because the information provided to 
them by Claimant 2 was original information from a report written by 
them.62  Dodd-Frank provides an original source exception, which 
states, “the Commission will consider you to be an original source of 
the same information that we obtain from another source if the 
information satisfied the definition of original information and the 
other source obtain the information from you or your 
representative.”63  Here, petitioners argue that because they wrote the 
report, they are the source of the original information.64  Both the 
SEC and the Second Circuit disagreed, stating that this rule applies to 
those that give information to another federal agency that then reports 
it back to the SEC.  Thus, the original person that provided the 
information is the original source, not the middle-man federal 
agency.65  Therefore, Kilgour and Williams are not entitled to 
whistleblower rewards.66 
 
Holding: 
 
In determining that the petitioners were not entitled to collect 
a whistleblower award, the Second Circuit upheld and affirmed the 
decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission.67  The court 
held that the Commission has the discretion to compare the sources 
of information, even if the information is relatively similar.  
Allowing this discretion gives room to the Commission to obtain the 
more accurate and critical information necessary to complete its 
                                                          
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
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investigation.68  Additionally, the court held that the whistleblower 
original source exception does not apply to those that help write the 
report, but that the exception only applies to other federal agencies 
acting as agents.69 
 
 
Impact: 
 
The most noticeable impact of this case is likely to fallout 
from the second part of the holding.  That is, the fact that those that 
write a whistleblower report do not fall within the exception of 
original information and are not eligible for whistleblower awards.  
In this case, Kilgour and Williams argued that by not allowing them 
to fall under this exception, it is likely to make all whistleblower 
applications moot.  Although the court did not agree with their 
argument, it still leaves the question as to whether or not there are 
any other exceptions to the original source rule.  At this point, only 
time will tell if other similar cases will be brought, which will help 
shed more light on this original source exception. 
 
 
OSI PHARMACEUTICALS, LLC V. APOTEX INC. 
939 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
After its patent challenge to the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board was denied for obviousness, OSI Pharmaceuticals appealed to 
the Federal Circuit arguing that because of the high failure rate of the 
art, one ordinary skilled in the art would not be able to invent the 
pharmaceutical in light of prior art.  35. U.S.C. § 103(a) requires that 
in order for something to be patentable, it must not be obvious to an 
ordinary person skilled “in a relevant field that could easily make the 
invention based on prior art.”  To summarize, if someone else who 
also practices in the field would be able to make the invention based 
on the prior art, then it is an obvious invention and is not deemed 
                                                          
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
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patentable.  The court reversed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s 
decision finding that, “a reasonable fact finder could not find a 
reasonable expectation of success.  The Board’s finding is thus not 
supported by substantial evidence….” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
Title 35 of the United States Code sets forth the rules and 
regulations of Patent Law in the United States.70  The minimal 
requirements of receiving a patent are patentable subject matter, 
novelty, obviousness, and enablement.71  Each one of these 
categories serves an important function in determining whether an 
invention, process or method is worthy of receiving a patent.  OSI 
Pharmaceuticals (“OSI”) appeal from the decision of the Patent Trial 
and Appeal Board, in which the Board held that OSI’s patent 
application was unpatentable because it was obvious in light of prior 
art.72  The Board found that numerous articles and references 
described parts of the patent application, though not all of aspects of 
the application was found in any single reference.73   
The Board found that the claimed combinations of the prior 
art “would have provided a person of ordinary skill with reasonable 
expectation of success ….”74  The Federal Circuit, examining each of 
the articles and references that the Board used in making its decision, 
determined that the articles did indeed reference what OSI was trying 
to patent, but no single article contained all of the claims and a 
combination of such articles would be required.75  The court found 
                                                          
70 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
71 35 U.S.C. §$ 101-112 (2012). 
72 OSI Pharmaceuticals, LLC v. Apotex Inc., 939 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
73 Id. at 1377. 
74 Id. at 1379. 
75 Id. at 1382-84. 
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that one of the articles was lacking efficacy data of the proposed 
drug, and that all other prior art was silent on those deficiencies.76  
Therefore, the references contained no data or any other promising 
information on the efficacy of the drug, which is evidence that one 
skilled in the art would not reasonable expect to succeed.77 
Looking to the history of pharmaceutical companies trying to 
manufacturer a drug that could treat small cell lung cancer, the court 
found more than 1630 attempts in doing so.78  The court found that 
once these drugs entered Phase II clinical studies, they were highly 
unpredictable and had a failure rate of roughly 99.5%.79  The court 
went on to state that because of his incredibly high failure rate, it was 
not persuaded that one ordinarily skilled in the art could reasonable 
expect to succeed when combining the prior art.80  Therefore, holding 
that the patent application was not obvious.81 
 
Holding: 
 
After deciding that the patent application was not obvious 
based on prior art, and that one ordinarily skilled in the art would not 
have reasonable expectation of success by combining these prior art 
references, the court reversed and remanded the Board’s decision.82  
The court said that because of the 99.5% failure rate and no efficacy 
data, there is not substantial evidence to suggest one would expect to 
succeed.83  However, the court clarified its holding by stating that, 
“we do not hold today that efficacy data is always required for a 
reasonable expectation of success.  Nor are we requiring absolute 
predictability of success.”84  The court went on, “we conclude only, 
that on these particular facts, a reasonable fact finder could not find a 
                                                          
76 Id. at 1384. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 1383. 
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 1385. 
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reasonable expectation of success.”85  Therefore, the Board’s finding 
is not supported by substantial evidence.86 
 
Impact: 
 
The impact of this case is unlikely to be significant or 
widespread, but it is further clarification of how 35 U.S.C. § 103 
claims are handled.  Previous section 103 cases have helped clarify 
what the Patent Trial and Appeal Board should do with ambiguous 
terms, and now this holding will help clarify what evidence is needed 
to be considered substantial evidence to hold something as obvious or 
not.  In determining if something is obvious the Board now has to 
determine all the relevant facts related to the prior art, including the 
failure rate of the prior art, because if something has an incredibly 
high failure rate, one cannot reasonable expect to succeed.   
 
 
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. V. ELMS 3DS INNOVATIONS, 
LLC. 
925 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
After its patent challenge to the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board was denied, Samsung Electronics appealed to the Federal 
Circuit claiming that multiple patents belonging to Elm 3DS 
Innovations were invalid because the claims were overbroad, and 
they lacked nonobviousness.  35. U.S.C. § 103(a) requires that in 
order for something to be patentable, it must not be obvious to an 
ordinary person skilled “in a relevant field that could easily make the 
invention based on prior art.”  In other words, if someone else who 
also practices in the field would be able to make the invention based 
on the prior art, then it is an obvious invention and is not deemed 
patentable.  The court affirmed both of the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board’s decisions.  First, the court held that although the Board’s 
interpretation of “substantially flexible” was overbroad, it was a 
                                                          
85 Id.  
86 Id. 
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harmless error.  Second, the patents were indeed patentable because 
one who is skilled in the art would not have found the combination of 
claims to be obvious, and thus, meets the nonobvious requirement.   
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
Title 35 of the United States Code sets forth the rules and 
regulations of Patent Law in the United States.87  The minimal 
requirements of receiving a patent are patentable subject matter, 
novelty, obviousness, and enablement.88  Each one of these 
categories serves an important function in determining whether an 
invention, process or method is worthy of receiving a patent.  
Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix (“Samsung”) appeal from the 
final decision of the Patent and Trial Board where the Board found 
that multiple patents held by Elm 3DS were patentable.89  Samsung 
challenged the patents claiming that the claim construction was 
overbroad and that in light of prior art, the patented inventions would 
be obvious.90 
In order to determine the meaning of “substantially flexible”, 
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board turned to the general-purpose 
dictionary in order to construe its definition.  Based on the dictionary, 
the Board determined that substantially flexible means “largely able 
to bend without breaking.”91  The Federal Circuit stated that by the 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board construing the definition of 
substantially flexible by using a dictionary, it lead to an overbroad 
determination of the meaning of the phrase.92  Instead, the court said 
that the Board should have construed it based on the “ordinary and 
customary meaning they would have to one of ordinary skill in the art 
in light of the specification and the prosecution history.”93  In other 
                                                          
87 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
88 35 U.S.C. §$ 101-112 (2012). 
89 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Elm 3DS Innovations, LLC, 925 F.3d 1373, 
1377 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
90 Id. at 1377. 
91 Id. at 1378. 
92 Id. at 1377. 
93 Id. 
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words, the Board should have construed it based on how someone 
trained in that art would have construed it based on the meaning of 
the patent application itself.  The court held that although the 
definition construed by the Board was overbroad, based on the 
evidence, including the patent application itself and testimony from 
Elm 3DS and its experts, the incorrect interpretation of substantially 
flexible would not have changed the result and it was merely a 
harmless error.94  Because of this, the court upheld the Board’s 
decision. 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), a claimed invention, process or 
method must be nonobvious in light of prior art to one trained or 
skilled in the particular or relevant field.95  That is, if someone else 
would have believed the invention, process or method was obvious 
just looking at the prior art, it is not deemed patentable.96  Samsung 
contends that the fabrication method disclosed would be obvious in 
light of prior art, because the combination of two prior references 
would achieve the same thing.97  According to the Board, Samsung 
failed to explain “how [the] fabrication process would be 
changed….”98  The Board “found that a person of ordinary skill in 
the art would not have been motivated to make such a combination 
and would not have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing 
so.”99  On Appeal, Samsung claimed that “the Board improperly 
required proof that unclaimed elements were combinable.”100  
However, the court stated that it is well-known that “obviousness 
based on teachings from multiple references does not require an 
actual, physical substation of elements.”101  The court went on to 
state that the only thing that matters in an nonobvious determination 
is “whether a person of ordinary skill in the art, having all the 
                                                          
94 Id. at 1380. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 1381. 
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teachings of the references before him, is able to produce the 
structure defined by the claim.”102 
 
Holding: 
 
After determining that Samsung’s argument, both for claim 
construction and nonobviousness, were invalid, the Federal Circuit 
upheld and affirmed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s decisions.  
With regard to nonobviousness, the court held that Samsung’s 
argument was too speculative to determine that the Board had errored 
in its ruling for Elm 3DS.103  The court agreed with the Board, stating 
that Samsung failed to meet their burden by stating the Board lacked 
substantial evidence.104  The court ultimately held that there was 
substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings. 
 
Impact: 
 
At this current time, due to how recently this case was 
publish, the impact of the decision is not really known or even 
speculated about.  It is likely that this case will be used for future 
precedent on how to construe specific terms and phrases within a 
patent application.  This decision will help shape the way the Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board goes about defining words that are 
ambiguous.  The Board should now look to the ordinary and 
customary meaning of the word within the art, instead of construing 
it with the dictionary definition, therefore, preventing an overbroad 
definition of the word.  With regard to obviousness, this case affirms 
the notion something is not obvious if a person with ordinary skill in 
the art would not have been motivated to make a combination if they 
had the reasonable expectation that they would not succeed. 
 
 
SECRETARY OF LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR V. SEWARD 
SHIP’S DRYDOCK, INC. 
937 F.3d 1301 (9th. Cir. 2019) 
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Synopsis: 
 
After the fallout of an April 2009 incident, in which thirteen 
violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) were 
reported, the Secretary of Labor and the Occupational Safety and 
Health Review Commission disagreed on the interpretation of 29 
C.F.R. § 1910.134(d)(1)(iii).  This section “requires the employer to 
identify and evaluate the respiratory hazard(s) in the workplace.  To 
perform this evaluation, the employer must make a reasonable 
estimate of the employee exposures anticipated to occur as a result of 
those hazards….”  The Commission determined, unanimously, that 
section 1910.134(d)(1)(iii) only requires an evaluation of respiratory 
hazards when respirators are necessary to protect the health of the 
employees.  The Secretary of Labor, on the other hand, argued there 
is no threshold requirement of necessity for employers to be required 
to identify and evaluate the workplace conditions.  Based on this, the 
Ninth Circuit granted the Secretary’s petition for review of the 
Commission’s decision.   
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
Under section 1910.134 of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970, “a respirator shall be provided to each employee 
when such equipment is necessary to protect the health of such 
employee.”105  Furthermore, section 1910.134(d)(1)(iii) states, “the 
employer shall identify and evaluate the respiratory hazard(s) in the 
workplace.”106  For years, the Secretary of Labor had interpreted this 
to mean that employers were required to “evaluate the respiratory 
hazards at their workplaces whenever there is the potential for 
overexposure of employees to contaminants, in order to determine 
whether respirators are necessary to protect the health of the 
employees.”107  The Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission (“Commission”) disagreed with the Secretary’s 
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interpretation of the statute and held that this section only applies 
when respirators have already been determined as necessary.108 
Prior to this case, it has long been held that a court cannot 
prefer one interpretation over another, and the court must use 
deference when hearing these types of cases, unless the terms are 
ambiguous.109  To determine whether a term is truly ambiguous, the 
court “must carefully consider the text, structure, history and purpose 
of the regulation.”110  “Doing so will resolve many seeming 
ambiguities out of the box.”111 
The court begins by looking at the text and structure of the 
regulation.112  In order to help determine the meaning behind the 
regulation, the court looks to the dictionary definition of the word 
hazard.  There, the court finds that the definition is “a thing or 
condition that might operate against success or safety.”113  The court 
finds that the definition of hazard is more aligned with the 
Secretary’s definition because “might” and “potential” are 
synonymous.114  The Commission, disagreeing, argued that there 
must be a showing of “a significant risk of harm necessitating the use 
of respirators.”115  The court held that the Commission’s 
interpretation is incorrect based on the text of the statute because the 
word “identify indicates that … the regulation applies even where an 
employer does not already know of the hazards in the workplace.”116 
Moving on to the purpose and history of the regulation, the court 
looks to the primary objective of the regulation.117  The court 
determined that the primary objective is “to prevent atmospheric 
contamination in order to prevent employees working in industrial 
facilities from experiencing occupational diseases caused by 
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breathing air contaminated….”118  Continuing, “to achieve this goal, 
the Standard requires an employer first to put in place engineering 
control measures, such as ventilation, as feasible.  Only if those 
measures are not feasible or are inadequate is the employer required 
to use respirators.”119  The court found that based on the 
Commissions interpretation of the Standard, an employer would only 
be required to evaluate hazards after it becomes clear that employees 
are being overexposed to contaminants.120  This is clearly at odds 
with the text because the primary objective is to prevent exposure.121  
Therefore, holding that section 1910.134(d)(1)(iii) requires employer 
evaluation for potential hazards.122 
 
Holding: 
 
After finding that the statutory text was ambiguous, and then 
running through the text, structure, purpose and history of the 
regulation, the Ninth Circuit held that that the Secretary’s 
interpretation was the proper interpretation of the Standard.123  The 
court reiterated by stating that “the text, structure, purpose and 
regulatory history of the Standard all point in the same direction.”124  
Thus, the court held that section 1910.134(d)(1)(iii) “requires an 
evaluation of which, if any, respiratory hazards exist in the workplace 
where there is a potential for overexposure of employees,” therefore, 
remanding the case back to the Commission.125 
 
Impact: 
 
The most noteworthy impact of this case will likely be the 
fallout on employers.  After this decision, employers will have to be 
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more cautious and proactive in checking the working conditions of 
their employers.  Employers will have to take a new approach and set 
up new mechanisms to make sure they are taking the appropriate 
actions before employees are subjected to overexposure of 
contaminants.  Going forward, the biggest winners from this decision 
are the employees, and because of this, they will now have greater 
access to health and safety devices, such as respirators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ZUNIGA V. BARR  
934 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2019) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
After being denied the right to counsel at a fear determination 
hearing, Baldemar Zuniga, a Mexican national, who illegally entered 
the United States as a child, appealed to the Ninth Circuit.  8 U.S.C. § 
1228(4)(b) states, “the alien shall have the privilege of being 
represented (at no expense to the government) by such counsel, 
authorized to practice in such proceedings, as the alien shall choose.”  
Zuniga alleges that he did not properly waive his right to counsel, 
and he was denied counsel at his hearing.  The Court of Appeals 
agreed with Zuniga, stating that the plain language of the statutory 
text is conclusive of providing the right of counsel to the petitioner.  
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded back to the 
immigration judge.   
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
Title 8 of the United States Code lays out the federal law 
dealing with immigration and nationality.126  Specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 
1228 handles expedited removal of aliens convicted of committing 
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aggravated felonies.127  In 2012, Zuniga was convicted of conspiracy 
of money laundering and the manufacturing and distribution of 
drugs.128  At this time, Zuniga testified in open court against his two 
co-conspirators, who were part of the Knights Templar cartel.129  
Because Zuniga was convicted of a felony, he was placed in 
expedited removal proceedings in accordance with section 1228.130  
During a routine interview with Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement officers, Zuniga expressed fear of being removed to 
Mexico based on retribution from cartel members for his testimony 
against his co-conspirators.131  At this point, he was sent to an 
asylum officer to determine if his fear was reasonable.132 
During his interview with the asylum officer, Zuniga was 
asked if he had an attorney, because it was his right to have an 
attorney present for the interview.133  Zuniga told the officer that he 
had an attorney for the reasonable fear proceedings, but that he was 
willing to continue the interview without the attorney present.134  The 
officer agreed and proceeded with the interview.135  At the end of the 
interview, the officer determined that Zuniga did not have reasonable 
fear of returning to Mexico and that the expedited proceedings should 
continue.136  Under Title 8 U.S.C. § 208.31(f)-(g), a non-citizen “will 
be afforded the opportunity for an expeditious review of the negative 
screening determination by an immigration judge.”137  Because 
Zuniga received a negative determination, he appealed to the 
immigration judge, arguing that his fear was indeed reasonable.138 
                                                          
127 Id. 
128 Zuniga v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1083, 1084 (9th Cir. 2019). 
129 Id. at 1084. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 1085. 
133 Id.  
134 Id. 
135 Id.  
136 Id. at 1086. 
137 Id.  
138 Id. 
    
Spring 2020       Legal Summaries 77 
During the hearing with the immigration judge, the judge 
informed Zuniga that he had the right to counsel of his own choosing, 
but the government will not pay for said counsel.139  He was 
previously given a list of counsel for him to look at and select.140  
The judge then asked if he had counsel, and Zuniga responded that he 
did not.141  After that, there was no more discussion about counsel 
and the judge went on to question Zuniga.142  The judge believed that 
this was sufficient to constitute a waiver of counsel.143  The 
immigration judge found that Zuniga did not have reasonable fear 
and upheld the asylum officer’s decision.144  Zuniga filed appeal to 
the Ninth Circuit claiming that his due process rights were violated, 
as well as the immigration judge had errored in determining his lack 
of reasonable fear.145   
On appeal, the government conceded to the fact that the 
conversation between Zuniga and the immigration judge was not 
sufficient as a waiver, but they do so because the government 
believes that there was no statutory right to a counsel anyway, so an 
ineffective waiver doesn’t matter.146   
 
Holding: 
 
The Ninth Circuit begins its analysis by looking at the plain 
language of the statutory text.147  The court, after reading all of 
sections 1228, 1229 and 1362, determine that that statute does indeed 
state that there is a “statutory right to counsel in … removal 
proceedings.”148  The court further states that all the above sections 
read together, reinforces the notion that there is a statutory right to 
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counsel.149  The court goes on to hold that, “the text of § 1228 is both 
clear and consistent with the statutory scheme at issue, the plain 
language of the statute is conclusive in providing a statutory right to 
counsel.”150 
In response, the government argued that a 1999 memo from 
the Executive Office for Immigration Review gave the government 
discretion in deciding whether or not a non-citizen had the right to 
counsel.151  The court agreed with the government, but the agreement 
was limited to the government have discretion only in the initial 
reasonable fear interview, not on appeal for a negative determination 
review.152  The court went on stating that the plain text of the statute 
outweighs the interpretation from the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review and Zuniga had the right to counsel.153  The 
court reversed and remanded back to the immigration judge, without 
answering the question as to Zuniga’s claim that the immigration 
judge errored on determining his reasonable fear.154 
 
Impact: 
 
The fallout of this case is unlikely to have a noticeable 
impact, but in smaller settings, there is likely to have more immediate 
impact.  The ruling of this case essentially states that the 1999 memo 
by the Executive Office for Immigration Review is invalid, holding 
that non-citizens do have a statutory right to counsel and it’s no 
longer at the discretion of the government.  Because of this, non-
citizens will now be afforded this right, which is only a benefit for 
those trying to appeal a negative decision from an asylum officer. 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 
 
HAYNES V. KOHL’S DEPARTMENT STORES, INC. 
391 F.Supp.3d 1128 (S.D. Fla. 2018) 
 
Synopsis: 
 
After unsuccessfully being able to access Kohl’s Department 
Store’s website because its website was incompatible with screen-
reading software, Dennis Haynes filed suit alleging that Kohls has 
violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).  
The court held that Mr. Haynes did in fact state a claim under Title 
III of the ADA and Kohl’s Department Store’s motion to dismiss was 
denied. 
 
Facts and Analysis: 
 
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act states, “[n]o 
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in 
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privilege, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation by any person who owns, leases, or operates a place 
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of public accommodation.”155  The issue is whether or not a website 
is considered a place of public accommodation.  Mr. Haynes “is blind 
and therefore unable to engage in and enjoy the major life activity of 
seeing, constituting a disability as defined by the ADA.”156  Mr. 
Haynes argues that he is unable to enjoy full access to the Kohl’s 
website because numerous parts of the website, including graphics, 
links, headings and other information are not readable because it is 
not compatible with his screen-reading software.  Kohls argues that a 
website is not protected by Title III of the ADA, and in the 
alternative, if it was protected under the ADA, then Kohls need not 
comply because it would violate its due process rights.157 
In analyzing the first issue, whether a website must be made 
ADA compliant, the district court looks to the precedent held by the 
Eleventh Circuit.158  In Rendon v. Valleycrest Products Limited, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that “Title III discrimination covers both 
tangible barriers, that is, physical and architectural barriers that 
would prevent a disabled person from entering an accommodation’s 
facilities and accessing its goods, services and privileges and 
intangible barriers that restrict a disabled person’s ability to enjoy the 
defendant entity’s goods, services and privileges.”159 
The Eleventh Circuit went on to give a test on whether a 
website is subject to the ADA, stating “websites are subject to the 
ADA if a plaintiff can establish a nexus between the website and the 
physical premises of the public accommodation.”160  In order to do 
this, the plaintiff must please facts that prove the “(1) Defendant’s 
website provides access to a benefit of Defendant’s physical store, 
and (2) Plaintiff was denied access to that benefit when he could not 
access Defendant’s website.”161  Here, Mr. Haynes argued that 
because the website was not compatible with his screen-reading 
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software, he was unable to place orders online for in-store pickup, he 
was unable to access a map of his nearby stores and he wasn’t able to 
print coupons to be used in those stores.”162  Accordingly, the district 
court found that a nexus had been established between the online 
website and the physical store.163  Therefore, there is a claim under 
Title III.164 
After establishing that Mr. Haynes had a Title III claim, 
Kohls argued that the claim should be dismissed because it violates 
its due process rights.165  Kohls argues that because there is no statute 
implementing regulations that a website needs to be ADA compliant, 
it violates their due process rights if they are held liable.166  
Additionally, they argue that holding Kohls liable for not being 
compatible with third-party software, in the absence of any 
regulations, is also a violation of their due process rights.167  With 
regard to Kohls’ first argument, the district court finds this 
unpersuasive because of the Rendon opinion that is sixteen years old 
at the time of this case.168  The court states that Rendon gave the 
defendant ample notice that websites can fall within the scope of 
Title III.169   
Next, the court looks to the definition of discrimination under 
Title III of the ADA.  Here, the court outlines that the act specifically 
outlines that a “failure to take such states as may be necessary to 
ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied 
services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other 
individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services.”  
The court takes aim at the “auxiliary aids and services” language of 
the statute and upon further examination, “auxiliary aids and 
services” include “screen reader software.”170  The court agrees with 
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the defendant that there is no guidance on making their website ADA 
compliant, but it goes on to state that it is abundantly clear that a 
website needs to be ADA compliant.171  The court points out that this 
is flexibility built into the statute to make it easier for websites to 
become ADA complaint.172  Thus, holding that making a website 
ADA complaint is not in violation of the defendant’s due process 
rights.173   
 
Holding: 
 
After determining that Mr. Haynes had a valid Title III claim, 
and that the claim did not violate the defendant’s due process rights, 
the court went on to deny Kohl’s motion to dismiss.174  The court 
determined that Mr. Haynes had pleaded sufficient facts to warrant a 
claim under Title III and it should go to a trier of fact to determine if 
Kohls had indeed breach the ADA.175  Lastly, the court found that 
Kohls had failed to establish a claim for violation of due process 
rights, and because of that, their motion to dismiss was denied.176 
 
Impact: 
 
Going forward, this case is likely to open the door for more 
cases with similar situation facts.  As the world moves to a more 
digital world, away from the physical, it is only a matter of time until 
the ADA will likely be amended to address the changes of 
technology and the future.  The Eleventh Circuit test of requiring a 
nexus between the physical place of accommodation and the website 
will likely be pushed to the limits as more and more retail shops close 
their doors and transition to the only the digital space.  Only time will 
tell, but this case is likely to the be the first of many more to come. 
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